Biology and Morality, Pro Tem

Campbell won. It's partly that I'm on deadline for that review, but it's mostly that he's a more compelling writer than Wilson. (Sorry, E.O., that's just the way it is.)

It's also partly that I hate this kind of philosophical writing that is ostensibly very logical but has all these fuzzy places in it that slide off in weird directions. Sorry, but I'm one who insists on clarity, which starts with defining terms pretty closely. I realize that's a problem with something like arguments about the origins of morality -- part of the reason for this discussion, after all, is to arrive at a definition of morality.

By way of basis, two points:

First, I'm an empiricist, in Wilson's terms. I don't have a great deal of comfort with the idea of universal constants that cannot be measured by physical means -- or for universal constants of any stripe: the more we learn, the more it seems that there are none. If those constants are immaterial, my comfort level plummets, quite aside from the fact that those "constants" -- moral precepts -- are perhaps more mutable than any other part of our universe (if you bother to pay attention to the findings of history, psychology, and anthropology). Whether this empiricism grows out of my religious beliefs or causes them, I'm not sure (and how's that for a cause-and-effect wrinkle?), but since I don't recognize any force outside the universe (except possibly other universes, which have their own concerns), science poses no threat to my beliefs or the morality that grows out of them, which, as it happens, throws the whole issue of moral decisions right into my lap. There is one great "thou shalt not" in Paganism: "Do no harm."

Second, this whole argument strikes me as a facet of the nature vs. nurture quandary. The question that seems germane in this context is "How much of nurture is the product of nature?" If you accept the idea that behavior is adaptive and heritable, that's not just a smart-ass question.

Update:

Ironically enough (although I can't say that I'm really surprised), Campbell proves to be germane to this whole question: what The Hero With A Thousand Faces examines, after all, is the relationship between myth, dreams, and the "spiritual constants" that ultimately make up our moral precepts. Campbell seems to be an empiricist, but don't quote me on that -- I haven't thought about it nearly enough to make that a definite conclusion.